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To Reconcile, or to be Reconciled?:

Agency, Accountability, and Law in
Middle Eastern Conflicts
By LAURIE KING-IRANI, PH.D.*

In early 1999, while working as a journalist in Washington, D.C., I
attended a private, off-the-record briefing by a high-ranking State
Department official from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. When asked
about U.S. support for democratization efforts in the region, the official
bluntly stated: "It does not serve U.S. national interests to encourage
democratization in the Middle East." Such developments, could, after all,
complicate our access to the region's key resource: oil. On a separate
occasion in 1998, my husband, Dr. George Irani, had participated in a
seminar hosted by the Foreign Service Institute to ascertain the best
methods for resolving protracted conflicts in the Middle East. My husband
called for the establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
(TRCs) to "police the past" in Lebanon and in Israel/Palestine, to empower
citizens to put harrowing events behind them, and to clear some space for
Arabs and Israelis to begin working together to shape a more just and
constructive future. In response, a State Department official present
countered that "Perhaps we should not forget another, equally important,
meaning of the word 'reconciliation': 'To reconcile oneself to harsh
realities'," in other words, to reconcile oneself to the prevailing political
order in the region, one that has avoided or sidelined the principles and
requirements of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)1 for decades,
*

Department of Anthropology, University of Victoria
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) refers to a body of laws and international

conventions intended to provide clear codes of conduct in times of armed conflict. IHL
criminalizes the worst offenses known to human experience. The laws define and attempt to
prevent war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Central to IHL are the Hague
Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907, which cover means and methods of warfare; the
Genocide Convention of 1948 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional
protocols of 1977. Collectively, these instruments stipulate the differences between legal

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 28: 3

regardless of whether republicans or democrats held the reins of power in
Washington, D.C.
Yet the establishment of polities characterized by freedom, equality,
free markets, civil society, and basic human rights was the supposed aim of
much post-Cold War U.S. policy, at least officially. The harmonizing of
discourses and agendas trumpeting democracy and free market initiatives in
the 1990s between USAID and organizations such as the Ford Foundation,
the National Endowment for Democracy, and the Soros Foundation did not
extend to every corner of the globe. Central Africa and the Middle East in
particular were overlooked as venues for ensuring democratization, the rule
of law, and the opening of social spaces for increasing political
participation. Was this really an oversight, or a by-product of a larger and
more systemic policy regime?
To grapple with searing legacies of institutionalized injustice and
political violence in the post Cold War era, South Africa, Chile, Argentina,
Brazil, Guatemala, and Northern Ireland got Truth Commissions, while the
carnage of the 1990s in the Balkans and Rwanda merited the institution of
the first war crimes tribunals by the international community since the end
of World War II. Yet past and current deadly conflicts in the Middle East
appear impervious to such moral and judicial ministrations: The toll of
civilian dead climbs daily in Israel and Palestine, where both sides in a
decades-long conflict break IHL with regularity and abandon, yet nary a
word is heard about the need to "police the past" or attempt international
legal intervention. And when efforts are made in this direction, as occurred
on July 9, 2004 when the International Court of Justice at The Hague
issued its advisory ruling stating that Israel's "Security Barrier" constitutes
a clear violation of international law and human rights law, the U.S.
government actively opposes and protests the principle
and consequences
2
of applying law to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

and illegal conduct in times of military hostilities and military occupation. The Genocide
Convention of 1948 defines genocide as certain acts "committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such." The Rome Statutes
of the International Criminal Court, adopted in 1998, represent a further refinement and
clarification of IHL. Of additional importance is the Nuremberg jurisprudence, which is the
closest analogue to treaties on war crimes and genocide, and which largely established the
law on crimes against humanity. At the heart of IHL is the stipulation that civilians and
civilian infrastructure are not to be directly and intentionally harmed in times of war or at
times of armed conflict.
2 See Threatened US Veto Puts Off UN Measure on Mideast, REUTERS, at
<www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/israel-palestine/2001/8-25sc.htm>
(August
25,
2001) (reporting that nearly a year after the beginning of the AI-Aqsa intifada, "Palestinians
were forced to put off a bid for a new U.N. Security Council resolution when many
members refused to face a promised veto from Washington for the second time this year.
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In Lebanon, chronic political tensions can erupt into a new round of
regionally destabilizing fighting at the slightest provocation. Stoking these
tensions is the bitter fact that there has never been a concerted, official
attempt to ascertain who bears responsibility for two decades' worth of war
crimes resulting in 125,000 killed and 17,000 disappeared (and still
missing). Such disrespect for the dead, no less than the corresponding
impunity enjoyed by their killers-many of whom are now ministers and
After a week of behind-the-scene arguments, Nasser al-Kidwa, the chief Palestinian U.N.
delegate, on Friday withdrew his draft resolution on the I1-month-old conflict with Israel,
saying it would be revived at a later day. The United States had made clear it would veto, as
it did in March, the Palestinian draft, which calls for a "monitoring mechanism" to cool the
violence that has killed more than 530 Palestinians and almost 150 Israelis since Sept. 28.
In December, the United States was spared its veto when a similar measure received one
less vote than required. A majority of the 15-member council, including Britain, France,
Norway and Ireland, would have liked to negotiate a resolution, but thought another U.S.
veto would have a negative impact. Russia, China and Singapore agreed and Colombia and
Ukraine hesitated, leaving only five nations -- Bangladesh, Mali, Mauritania, Jamaica and
Tunisia -- as sure supporters for the Palestinian measure, diplomats said... .Most members
wanted to see the council stake out a position on the Middle East crisis, fearing the council
would otherwise be downgraded and lose its effectiveness on other issues, such as sanctions
against Iraq. But Israel, backed by the United States, wants no council action, apprehensive
that an internationalization of the crisis would work against it. "Any resolution is a
nonstarter as far as we are concerned. We will oppose a resolution by whatever means we
have to," U.S. representative to the United Nations James Cunningham said."
The US government did not hide its displeasure with the Belgian government's
universal juridsiction legislation that offered up Belgium's national courts for the
prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity even in cases where the victims and
the perpetrators had no nexus with Belgium. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
during a visit to Brussels on 13 June 2003, warned that the US might consider moving
NATO headquarters to Warsaw unless the Belgian parliament rescinded its progressive
universal jurisdiction ("anti-atrocity") legislation. At the time of Rumsfeld's speech, one of
the main cases in the Belgian dock under the universal jurisdiction law was a complaint
filed by 28 survivors of the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacre against Israeli Defense Force
(IDF) commanders and Lebanese militia leaders. More recently, in the ICJ's 9 July 2004
advisory ruling on Israel's Separation Barrier, the only judge to dissent to each of the
sections of the advisory ruling was US Judge Buergenthal. As this article was being
prepared for publication, the IDF launched a bloody incursion of the northern Gaza Strip in
retaliation for Hamas militants' firing of unguided Qassam missiles into the Israeli town of
Sderot, an act which took the lives of two small Israeli children. As a result of Israel's
disproportionate response, which evidences clear violations of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, over 70 Palestinians, most of them civilians, have been killed and numerous
houses and businesses have been demolished and razed.). See also PalestiniansPush for
UN Resolution, THE AGE
(Australia) (October 5,
2004), available
at

<www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/10/05/1096949487274.html> (Stating that, "The

Palestinians have pushed for the quick adoption of a United Nations Security Council
resolution demanding an end to the massive Israeli thrust into the Gaza Strip. The offensive
has killed up to 73 Palestinians and three Israelis in six days of fighting. But in stiff
opposition, United States Ambassador John Danforth admonished the council, which he said
,acts as the adversary of the Israelis and cheerleader to the Palestinians' and said another
resolution was not the answer").
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parliamentarians in the current Lebanese government-are part of a larger
pattern of the region's interrelated crimes, corruption, and crises.
The writ of international law does not extend to the Middle East.
Although I will focus on Lebanon and Israel/Palestine in this presentation,
Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan are just a few other
countries in which a culture of impunity has reigned for decades. This may
be due, in part, to a sturdy coating of cultural "teflon" that repels critical
questions, frustrates applications of IHL, deflects attempts at criminal
prosecutions, and thwarts local attempts at attaining restorative justice.
The metaphorical coating that helps to prevent legal investigations of and
judicial intervention in some of the world's most protracted and lethal
conflicts is comprised, in large part, of culturally constructed stereotypescollective representations and reifications of the essential nature of
purportedly ancient conflicts pitting one tribal people against another in the
logic of the blood-feud or because of religious conundrums that long ago
turned ugly. Discourses of reconciliation and calls for "traditional" or
"culturally relevant" peacemaking that skirt crucial legal dimensions of
Middle Eastern conflicts serve only to hinder the resolution of this region's
increasingly lethal problems.
Like stereotypes elsewhere, those current in and about the Middle East
are indispensable for affirming identities, legitimating ideologies, and
rationalizing policies. Current U.S. discourses about an alleged "axis of
evil" following the September 2001 attacks on the United States share
fundamentalist visions that are, ironically, quite at home with Al-Qa'eda's
ravings andfatwas against Westoxification.3 Whereas IHL stresses
universality and asserts a common, shared foundation linking all humanity,
nationalist ideologies, no less than tribal stereotypes (to which they bear
more than a passing resemblance) 4 insist on difference,
incommensurability, and exceptionalism. Among the nations echoing the
United States' rejection of the International Criminal Court (ICC) are some
of the worst offenders of IHL in the Middle East: Iraq, the Sudan, Syria,

3 Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have criticized the marked and
growing tendency to manipulate discourses and rhetoric of safety and purity underpinning
the new "global war on terror" in order to violate the rights of ethnic minorities in Central
Asia and Russia, no less than to commit violations of the Geneva Conventions, as witnessed
in the U.S. Army's treatment of alleged al-Qa'eda combatants at "Camp X-Ray." Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch have also decried repressive state measures limiting
freedoms of the press, speech, and assembly in countries now designated as "allies" in the
fight against Al-Qa'eda.
4 LIISA MALKKI, PURITY AND EXILE: VIOLENCE, MEMORY, AND NATIONAL COSMOLOGY
AMONG HuTU REFUGEES IN TANZANIA

247-48, 250 (1995).

2005]

To Reconcile, or to be Reconciled?

and Israel.5 "No yardstick for human rights but ours!" could be their
common motto.
My ethnographic and journalistic experiences have alerted me to a
strong correlation between continuing impunity for grave breaches of IHL
and the dangerous erosion of the fabric of constructive social engagement
and political participation in the Middle East. The damaged intersubjective
tissues of Israeli, Palestinian, and Lebanese society provide a nurturing
environment for the scourges of extremism, frustration, hatred, despair, and
political violence. Applying the perspectives and mechanisms of IHL and
U.N. resolutions to the varied and deadly conflicts in the Middle East is a
moral imperative at a time when torture, extrajudicial killings, home
demolitions, ethnic cleansing, and wanton destruction of crucial civilian
infrastructure dominate daily news headlines. 6 TRCs, though crucial for
post-conflict reconciliation and the trust-building needed to begin restoring
political and administrative structures and processes, are not sufficient for
addressing or resolving the roots of the blood-drenched crises of the Middle
East. Assuming that interpersonal reconciliation processes can bear the
weight of such a task is cynical as well as dangerous.
Anthropology, perhaps more than any other discipline, can help to
formulate, investigate, and pose answers to questions designed to trace the
roots of conflict, and the routes to their resolution, in the Middle East:
How do people in diverse socio-political and cultural settings make sense
of concepts such as human rights, torture, genocide, and war crimes? What
are the social and cultural matrices through which these concepts are
mediated? U.N. bodies and international legal experts? The media? A
plethora of emerging NGOs? How and why do people in the most
marginalized regions and sectors of the Middle East appropriate the
discourses, rhetoric, and imperatives of IHL? Does this affect their
experience and exercise of power, their modes of social and political
organization regionally, nationally, and transnationally? Are rights just a
cultural construct? Do they belong to individuals or collectivities? Who
5 So far, the only country in the Arab Middle East to ratify the ICC is the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.
6 See Seymour M. Hersh,Torture at Abu Ghraib, Ta NEW YORKER (May 10, 2004),

available at <www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fafact>. Jeffrey Goldberg,
Among the Settlers: Will they Destroy Israel?, THE NEW YORKER (May 31, 2004), available
at <www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040531 fafact2_a>. Chris McGreal, 50,000
Trapped by Israeli Assault on Gaza, THE GUARDIAN (October 5, 2004), available at

<www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1319776,00.html>.

How will Damascus

respond?: The Assassinationof a Hamas Member in Syria Will Be Avenged, THE GUARDIAN
(September
29,
2004),
available
at
<www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1314965,00.html>.
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guarantees rights? A family? A sect? A state?7
An issue of profound concern for activists no less than theorists
utilizing ethnographic methods to understand the reception and application
of IHL in actual socio-political settings in the Middle East is that of power,
or more specifically, the locus of power. Here we enter the terrain of
institutional analysis and begin to grapple with a crucial issue: structural
violence.
Questions of authority, sovereignty, jurisdiction, and enforcement
go to the heart of the current debate surrounding the progressive evolution
of international criminal prosecution. Such questions require that we
analyze and critique the role and the structure of the state as an actor. This
requires a structural, political economy, and organizational analysis more
so than a symbolic or a cultural exegesis. A TRC's focus cannot
encompass these crucial dimensions. In fact, emphasizing the benefits of
TRCs may well serve to occlude larger and more troubling questions that,
if asked, could widen our focus to include matters beyond the Middle
Eastern political imaginary and lead us to consider new, unsettling,
questions about the complicity of the West in the sufferings of the East 8.
The Culture of Impunity versus the Culture of Accountability
The Truth and Reconciliation (or Truth and Justice) Commission has
comprised a leading theoretical and applied approach to some of the
Guaranteeing, sustaining, and assuring just
questions raised above.
resolution of conflicts takes more than staged handshakes or eloquent
Individuals and organizations with noble
statements of good will.
intentions are welcome, but power still resides in states and courts. TRCs
can be classified under the general rubric of Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) mechanisms and the restorative justice approach. All represent
attempts to avoid the courts-and their precedent-setting rulings-by
resolving conflicts outside formal, institutional structures. As Laura Nader 9
has noted, ADR can have an unfortunate unintended consequence: enabling
all parties to a conflict to side-step deeper analyses of, and interventions in,
7 Ellen Messer, Anthropologists in a World with and without Human Rights, in EXOTIC No
MORE: ANTHROPOLOGY AT THE FRONT LINES 319, 327 (Jeremy MacClancy, ed., 2002);
RICHARD WILSON, HUMAN
PERSPECTIVES 14, 17 (1997).

RIGHTS,

CULTURE,

AND

CONTEXT:

ANTHROPOLOGICAL

Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A PoliticalPerspective on Culture and
Terrorism 104 (3) AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 766, 769-771, 773 (2002).
9 Laura Nader, Civilization and its Negotiations, in UNDERSTANDING DISPUTES: THE
POLITICS OF ARGUMENT 39, 59-60 (Pat Caplan ed., 1995).
8
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institutionalized injustices and structural violence.1l When such injustices
are ignored, those who commit or enable them are permitted to continue
enjoying impunity. This in turn legitimizes a social structure tilted towards
the powerful while also entrenching a legacy of victimization, whether the
venue is a small municipal council in Mexico or a nation state in the
Middle East. Those involved in conflict resolution and communal
reconciliation projects, whether at the diplomatic or grassroots level, have
side-stepped critical analyses of the region's complex history of structural
violence and institutionalized injustice.
As any cursory glance at the evening news reveals, shuttle diplomacy
and people-to-people projects (Track II diplomacy) have had scant success
in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite the considerable
amounts of time, effort, and resources devoted to the now-defunct Oslo
"peace process" and its successor, the "Road Map." The flaws in the Oslo
process were not merely technical. 1 Oslo represented a coerced agreement
between profoundly unequal partners. It did not broach troubling questions
of justice, legitimacy, or accountability, preferring to focus instead on
logistical matters while postponing any "policing of the past" to a future
unspecified stage.
Indeed, Oslo circumvented the Fourth Geneva Convention while also
riding roughshod over key UN resolutions (242 and 338)12 concerning the
ultimate resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both of which
emphasize the illegality of acquiring territory by force. As legal scholar
Kathleen Cavanaugh has noted:
Alarmingly, these flawed political agreements [Oslo and Dayton]
have assumed a de facto legal status and have displaced relevant
international law in practice.
As a result, compliance with
international human13 rights and humanitarian law has been
rendered negotiable.
10 Id
I Joel Beinin, The Demise of the Oslo Process, MIDDLE EAST REPORT (Mar. 26, 1999), at
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero032699.html; B'TSELEM, OSLO BEFORE AND AFTER:

THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (1999); Kathleen Cavanaugh,
The Cost of Peace:Assessing the Palestinian-IsraeliAccords, in 211 MIDDLE EAST REPORT

10, 10-12 (1999); Sara Roy, De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society
Since Oslo, in THE JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES 64, 64-82 (Spring 1999).

S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SC, U.N. Doc. S/8053/Add.3 (1967); S.C. Res. 338, U.N. SC,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (1973).
13 Cavanaugh, supra note 11, at 10. See also Rashid Khalidi, approaching the same problem
from a normative and historical perspective, noted on the webpage of the Jewish progressive
12

monthly, TIKKUN:

[P]erhaps the most important flaw of the [Oslo] 'peace process' is that
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This development has put international legal prosecution on a very
slippery slope in one particularly bloody region of the contemporary world.
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, being "compromises between
prosecution or amnesty,"' 14 and thus alternatives to legal prosecution, also
run the risk of providing amnesty for crimes such as genocide and torture
which, under international conventions, are not subject to any statutes of
limitation in judicial prosecution.' 5 TRCs deal primarily with the moral
and psychosocial as opposed to the legal challenges facing societies
transitioning from war or dictatorships to peace and more democratic
systems of governance. By "policing the past" and providing a public,
official account of misdeeds, such commissions assign responsibility for
violations of human rights and provide blueprints for modifying future
relationships and policies. Ideally, this process enables victims and
victimizers to transcend a troubling past, achieve individual and collective
closure, and begin anew.
This process has not been smooth or simple, however, even in the
most well publicized example in South Africa. The problems of the TRC
were best illustrated in the pursuit by anti-Apartheid activist Steve Biko's
widow of legal redress against the men who brutally tortured and murdered
her husband.16 Despite wide international support for South Africa's
during these seven years of [discussing technical matters], a golden
opportunity has been lost to begin to build real peace between the Arabs
and Israel. Such a peace must be based on reconciliation, and this in turn
requires that Palestinians and Israelis start to attempt to reconcile their
different historical narratives. The gap between them is vast, in particular
regarding the Palestinian refugees who constitute the majority of the 6
million plus Palestinian people and whose vital concerns have been
completely ignored in all the negotiations thus far .... [I]t is clear that the
actual outcome [of Oslo] has been the opposite of its stated intention.
Because Isrdel was not prevented from continuing to build settlements, or
from changing the situation in Jerusalem in its favor, or from maintaining
absolute control over water resources in the occupied territories, the status
quo in the territories has continued to change massively in its favor.
Rashid I. Khalidi, Why This "Peace Process" Will Not Lead to Peace, TIKKUN (Jan.-Feb.
1999)
at
<http://tikkun.org/magazine/index.cfm/action/tikkun/issue/tik9901/article/990112 .html>.
"'Reed Brody, Justice: The First Casualtyof Truth?, THE NATION, April 30, 2002, at 26.
'" Id.at 25-32.

16 During the May 2004 conference at which an earlier version of this paper was presented,
Prof. E. Barkan noted that Mrs. Biko is not the subject of the South African TRC. My
rejoinder is to cite political philosopher Will Kymlicka's observation that "Groups have no
moral claim to well-being independent of their members-groups just aren't the right sort of
beings to have moral status ....It is individual, sentient beings ....who suffer or flourish,

and so it is their welfare that is the subject-matter of morality." WILL KYMLICKA,
LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 241-42 (1989). TRCs rarely have legally-binding
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ground-breaking TRC, some scholars and lawyers are concerned about the
implications of its lack of mechanisms for punishing torturers and killers,
particularly since South Africa's TRC has set a precedent for other
societies in transition. As Hayner (2001) notes:
Human rights advocates are concerned that official truth seeking is
sometimes used as a means to avoid trials for rights abusers.... In
South Africa, justice was put up for trade: The TRC offered
freedom from prosecution in exchange for the full truth about
politically motivated crimes. This fuels concern that other TRCs
may lead to weakened prospects for pursuing justice in the judicial
system.... Many legal scholars argue that international customary
law, which has universal application, requires prosecution for
crimes against humanity,
and therefore renders all amnesty
17
declarations illegal.
Although such commissions have been instituted to address and
transcend protracted conflicts in societies as diverse as Guatemala, South
Africa, and Northern Ireland, TRCs have yet to be instituted officially to
address some of the longest, bloodiest, and most bitter conflicts of the last
thirty years: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict 8 and the devastating Lebanese
civil war of 1975-1990. These two multidimensional conflicts intersected
brutally in 1982 when Israel invaded war-torn Lebanon, killing an
estimated 15,000 civilians in the space of four months as well as playing a
crucial role in enabling the Sabra and Shatila massacres of September
1982, in which over 1000 civilians were slaughtered and another 1000
disappeared over a period of two and a half days by Israel's proxies, the
Christian Phalangist militia. 19 In both Israel/Palestine and Lebanon, the
past remains un-policed, international laws and conventions remain
powers. They are moral endeavors, thus, Kymlicka's observations on the moral and legal
status of groups bear serious consideration. As the reader will note, much of the remainder
of this paper turns on similar issues.
17 Hayner, Priscilla,
UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND
ATROCITY (2001).
18 1 refer here to the multi-dimensional Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which entails three
distinct unresolved conflicts: one between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and
Gaza, which has once again assumed a violent, militarized form; another between Israel and
its own Palestinian citizens, which usually assume a legal/political form, but which turned
violent in October 2000; and last but not least, the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinian refugees, which may best be described as an existential/political conflict, and
which is perhaps the most threatening to Israelis, despite its current lack of a militarized
dimension.
19 Three months after the massacres, the Kahan Commision, a non-judicial investigative
body in Israel, found General Ariel Sharon, then minister of defense, "personally
responsible" for the massacres and asked him to relinquish his cabinet post.
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disregarded, conflicts remained unresolved, and victims-Lebanese,
individually and collectively
Israelis, and Palestinians-remain
unacknowledged, unhealed, and uncompensated. Impunity reigns.
Let us survey some possible explanations for the strange absence of
both TRCs and war crimes tribunals to address these particularly volatile
and dangerous conflicts.
1. The Cultural Dimension: Collective Stereotypes and Tribal
Mentalities
It is a very anthropological question to ask: Is justice universal and
indivisible? Are rights and wrongs judged similarly in vastly different
societies?
The conceptions of accountability, morality, and justice
undergirding most truth commissions' efforts may not be as self-evident or
as universal as most Western governments, foundations, and NGOs have
assumed as they applaud - and fund - TRCs in South Africa, Latin

American, and Northern Ireland. Forgotten in the rush to heal ruptures,
accelerate transitions, and attain closure is the culturally specific locus of
political accountability and transformation: Does it reside in the individual
or in collectivities? To and for whom is justice done? Questions
concerning the contexts and negotiated definitions of justice assume added
significance in the case of Lebanon and Israel/Palestine, where individuals'
political representation and participation is determined by their
membership in ethno-confessional collectivities that, despite state
discourses of democracy and civil rights in both societies, are hierarchically
ranked and differentially privileged. It is not just Mr. A or Ms. Z who are
victims in such a society, it is Group A or Community Z that perceives
itself as collectively humiliated and aggrieved. The stakeholders in
achieving reconciliation or pursuing justice, then, it must be assumed, are
not simply the close family of the victims, but entire sectors or classes of a
society.
One reason for the dearth of TRCs and war crimes tribunals in the
Middle East may be the perceived salience of collective, as opposed to
individual, bases of political representation, legal categorization, and public
participation, and a concomitant assumption that conflicts in the region are
tribal, deeply rooted, essential and thus inevitable. Former Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright once opined to the press that the IsraeliPalestinian conflict was such a tough political nut to crack because its roots
went back to biblical times. Such invocations of ancient history are
common in the mainstream media's depiction of the conflicts in "The Holy
Land" as well.
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Similarly, during a cocktail party in Beirut in 1996, a USAID
representative responded with horror to an idea that I and a Lebanese ADR
specialist had proposed to establish a TRC to address the unhealed wounds
of Lebanon's war years: "Are you mad?" he exclaimed. "There's been six
years of peace! Why the hell would you want to stir up that tribal
bloodbath again!? It's wiser to let sleeping dogs lie!" Though I was taken
aback by his comment at the time, I now agree with his distrust of the TRC
process - but for very different reasons than his.
The perception that Lebanese and Israeli-Palestinian societies, polities,
and conflicts are tribal and rooted in age-old, religio-cultural precepts,
identities, and mentalities easily gives way to an essentialization not simply
of the conflicts, but of the parties to the conflict. Middle Eastern peoples
are frequently reduced and mythologized as war-like, troubled, violent, and
barbaric. Former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was fond of
reminding CNN audiences that "This is a dangerous neighborhood of the
world; we can't deal with things here the way you would in the West!"2 °
Thus, tribal vengeance trumps reconciliation, ADR, and IHL, while group
dynamics trump individual agency and collaborative democratic politics.
Perhaps this is why the U.S. government has traditionally seemed more
intent on conflict management than conflict resolution in Lebanon, Israel,
and Palestine - a project that has failed miserably.
The weight of history and entrenched collective stereotypes hang
heavy over Israel/Palestine and Lebanon. But, as historian Ussama
Makdisi notes in his incisive study of the roots of confessional conflict in
Lebanon, sectarianism is not an ancient and deeply rooted identity system.2
Rather, it first appeared as a thoroughly modern response to jarring internal
and external changes in the mid-19th century Ottoman Empire.2 2
Confessionalism, like ethnicity, is about contests for power in uncertain
settings. It is not a genetically transmitted mentality, an ineluctable set of
traits, or a communally rooted phenomenon.
Makdisi observes that "The war in Lebanon is now over.
Sectarianism is not."2 3 To dismantle Sectarianism, or, as it is termed in
20

See Jerrold Kessel,

Stalled Peace Process Casts Pall on

Celebration, at

www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/israel/kessel.essay/, noting that, "[R]ight-wing Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has convinced at least half his countrymen that the Middle
East is still 'a very bad neighborhood' -- a place where suspicion and deep-rooted security
concerns are again the dominant sentiments. Peace lags far behind security in the doublebarreled promise on which Netanyahu came to power two years ago."
21 USAMA MAKDISI, THE CULTURE OF SECTARIANISM: CoMMUNITY, HISTORY, AND VIOLENCE
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN LEBANON (2000).
22

1d. at2.

23

Id at xi.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 28:3

Lebanon, taa 'ifiyya (confessional power-sharing), Makdisi urges us to look
not at religion and culture, but rather to attend to political and economic
realities as well as local conceptions and practices of power in their
articulation and interaction with regional and global political
Confessionalism is grounded in globalization, not
configurations.24
tribalism; it is a correlate of processes of modernity, not ancient history.
Collective identities based on confessional membership still greatly
influence political representation, action, and social organization in Israel,
too. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that both Lebanon and Israelthe only two countries in the Middle East that claim to be democraciesare living remnants of the Ottoman millet system. Citizenship, as juridical
category, social institution, bundles of rights and duties, and lived practice,
differs in Israel and Lebanon from most Western nation-states in that
citizens' jural relationships to the state, as well as their political agency, are
mediated through ascribed membership in hierarchically ranked ethnoconfessional sects. One's rights to attain particular offices, own or sell
land, or receive state benefits is contingent upon whether one is a Jew or a
non-Jew in Israel, or whether one is a Maronite, Sunni, Shi'i, Druze, or any
one of the 18 officially recognized ethno-confessional sects in Lebanon, a
country unique in being comprised solely of minorities. In both Lebanon
and Israel, personal status issues, i.e., all matters related to marriage,
divorce, child custody, inheritance, and burial, are overseen not by the
state, but by religious law and the clergy. Hence, in Lebanon and Israel
alike, civil marriage between individuals of different ethno-confessional
communities is not permitted.
Not only citizenship as an institution, but also the individual as a
cultural construct, a subject of political practice, and a locus of legal rights
is complicated by Confessionalism in Lebanon and Zionism in Israel. As
the Israeli-Palestinian novelist, Anton Shammas, has sardonically observed:
"There are no Israelis in Israel," only Jews, Arabs (Muslims as well as
Christians) and Druze, the three official categorizations of membership in
the state.2 5 One cannot act or speak first and foremost as "an Israeli
24

25

Id. at 2.
Anton Shammas, Palestinians in Israel: You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet, 3 J. INT'L INST.

(1995), available at <http://www.umich.edu/-iinet/journal/vol3nol/palest.html>.
The
political nature of the construction of ethnoconfessional categories in the context of Zionist
discourse in Israel is revealed by the fact the Druze are considered as a separate community
from other Arabs, in fact, as non-Arabs as well as non-Jews. In all other countries of
region, Druzes are considered Arabs. See Lisa Hajjar, Speaking the Conflict, or How
Druze became bilingual: a Study of Druze Translatorsin the Israeli Military Courts in
West Bank and Gaza, 23 ETHNIC & RACIAL STuD. 299 (2000) for an incisive study of

the
the
the

the
Druzes' positioning in Israeli society and their intriguing role in the Israeli Defense Forces.
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citizen/individual," but only as a member of one of these three groups, a
personal and public predicament creatively highlighted by the political
activism of Dr. Azmi Bishara, a Palestinian Member of the Knesset who
attempted to run for prime minister in 1999 in order to critique the
contradiction implicit in Israel's claim to be both a democratic and a Jewish
state. Individuals' rights and needs are secondary to communal needs, and
in Israel, the Jewish community's rights and needs always take precedence.
The perception that Maronite needs and rights had primacy in Lebanon was
a key contributing factor to the long civil war.
Structurally and legally, the similarities between Israeli and Lebanese
citizenship and group identities are uncanny. At the conclusion of a 1994
conference on Acknowledgement, Reconciliation, and Forgiveness in
Beirut, an astute participant commented:
In order to have reconciliation and forgiveness, you need to have
individuals. Only individuals can change patterns of relationship at
the micro level, and thus set the stage for changes at the macro
level. Lebanon is a very individualistic society, but unfortunately
26
we don't have individuals, we only have confessional sects.
How, then, are accountability, morality, and agency to be apportioned
when investigating (or attempting to halt) the long-term effects of
intercommunal conflicts in societies in which the basic unit of political
action and representation is not the individual (i.e., the citizen), but rather
the ethno-confessional group (i.e., the tribe or sect)? Who is responsible
for past violations of rights: particular individuals or generalized
collectivities? Who is best placed to oversee the transition from cycles of
violence to peace and security? The leaders (often clerics) of the various
groups that comprise Lebanese and Israeli society--and who serve as the
gatekeepers and boundary police for their respective communities?
Or are individuals who resist the constrictions of such narrow,
politically and legally constructed identity categorizations - artificially
frozen cultural constructs deployed to political advantage - better prepared
to forge new, flexible, and hybrid modes of political representation,
solidarity, and action that transcend entrenched social, political and
cognitive structures so rife with conflicts and contradictions? Such
questions center on a key issue: in whose interest is it to preserve and
perpetuate the identity traps and essentialized solidarities of Lebanon's
Confessionalism and Israel's Zionism? In whose interest is it not to apply
26

And it must be noted that the woman who made this comment did so with chagrin and a
frustration at the obstacles Confessionalism presents to personal and political potentialities
inLebanon.
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the standards and requirements of IHL to increasingly lethal conflicts of the
Middle East? Have processes of stereotyping and the essentialization of
collective identities - encouraged and reproduced by Lebanese and Israel
governmental discourses, political cartoons, tourism images, political
parties, and legal categorizations no less than by Western media depictions
and official policy conceptions of age-old, tribal vendettas - delayed moral,
legal, and political processes of reconciliation in these societies?
Such inquiries may lead to conclusions supportive of Peter Gran's
critical observations about "Middle East Exceptionalism" in academic and
policy discourses about the region:
I take exceptionalism to be part of the larger problematic of
representation of self and other .... Middle East exceptionalism is

the proposition that this region has followed an historically unique
trajectory that renders it essentially different from an undefined,
universal norm. Exceptionalism is too often a means of
marginalizing the region.... Positivists have frequently interpreted
the supposed religiosity of the Middle East as a special obstacle to
development

....

Thus the Middle East, given its supposed

religiosity, is unusually handicapped.27
2. The Political Dimension: "Keep the pot boiling, but don't let it
overflow"
Perhaps the primary reason for the strange absence of truth
commissions and war crimes tribunals in Israel/Palestine and Lebanon is
less complex and more straightforward than the reasons presented above.
Maybe it is just too early. Perhaps people are not yet ready to lay down
their arms or bury the hatchets. Or maybe those in positions of power inside the region and out - are not yet ready to relinquish the reins of
influence and manipulation that the region's protracted conflicts and
collective identity stereotyping place in their hands.
One can argue that neither Lebanon nor Israel/Palestine has yet made
the sort of dramatic, defining transition from one political stage to another
that might necessitate a commission or a tribunal to institutionalize the
change from past to present, such as happened in Eastern Europe, Latin
America, and South Africa a decade ago. As a colleague in Beirut
observed in late 2001, upon being asked why neither truth commissions nor
war crimes tribunals had ever been instituted to police Lebanon's past: "It's
simple," he said; "the war has not yet ended. We have not yet had any
27

Peter Gran, Contending With Middle East Exceptionalism, 6 ARAB STUDIES J. 1, 1-9
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transition. No one dares to raise such issues now, as there is actually less
freedom of thought, expression and assembly now than there was during
the war."
The absence of any attempt or space to police the past in Israel and
Palestine became especially clear during the World Conference against
Racism in South Africa in the summer of 2001. One of, if not the, most
polarizing issues at that conference was the question of whether Zionism
constituted a racist ideology and practice. Although there may have been
unsavory instances of individuals and groups deploying this discourse
before and during the conference in a hurtful and aggressive - indeed, in a
racist - manner, there were many more efforts to discuss Zionism as an
ideology and practice in a reasoned, constructive, and honest manner. Yet
all attempts to broach this issue, whether aggressive or reasonable, were
met with the same official statements of condemnation and rejection by
most Western governmental officials and NGOs.
It would be an exaggeration to say that the topic was censored, yet it
was clear that attempts to police the Israeli-Palestinian past are still too
controversial to be realized by an official truth commission, let alone a war
crimes tribunal. Furthermore, in spite of the nearly decade-long Oslo
process, which collapsed in late 2000, there are numerous objective
indicators to suggest that genuine intercommunal reconciliation was no
closer on the eve of Oslo's death than it had been in September 1993 when
Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn.
To the contrary: antipathies had grown sharper and socioeconomic
disparities wider between Israelis and Palestinians than at any time in the
past 30 years28 Indeed, friends, colleagues, relatives and ethnographic
informants in Israel-Palestine and Lebanon have characterized their
situation over the last decade as one of anxiety and "suspended animation"
(kullu shi mu 'alliq bil-hawa, "everything is hanging in the air"), frustration
and despair (iHbaaT), and filled with bitter, even dangerous, levels of
anger and rage (ghaDb).
The repercussions of unresolved conflicts, un-policed pasts, and
continuing violations of the human rights of Lebanese, Israelis, and
Palestinians exacerbate feelings of hopelessness and victimization and
erode the intersubjective fabric of social and political life. Peace,
democracy, and human rights are seriously threatened by such a state of
28
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affairs. By permitting impunity to reign and thereby exterminating the
juridical sense in Lebanese, Palestinians, and Israelis-which is precisely
what the continuing failure to apply IHL in the region does-political
action and coordination on projects to achieve reconciliation and strengthen
democracy are weakened by profound mistrust and a paralyzing pessimism
about the region's future. Nothing describes the situation on the ground in
Israel/Palestine and Lebanon now more succinctly than a verse from
William Butler Yeats poem, "The Second Coming": "The best lack all
29
conviction while the worst are full of a passionate intensity.
Dysfunctional forms of leadership and cycles of violence and revenge are
but further indices of impunity's triumph in the Middle East.
This, however, might be the whole point, geo-strategically speaking.
It is possible that maintaining the current dysfunctional political and social
situation on the ground serves wider political interests. As a political
columnist for the leftist-secular As-Safir newspaper in Beirut observed in
November 2001 during the course of a conversation that began with his
passionate demand that the United States and the United Nations
immediately apply international legal standards to the entire Middle East to
save everyone from the dangers of extremist Islamicist groups:
Keeping the conflicts in this region in a state of suspended
animation, keeping everything on a low boil-neither out in the
open nor completely behind us-is a major political tool in the
hands of the powerful. Not resolving the Lebanese war or the
Israeli-Palestinian tragedy serves a purpose: It keeps people
unbalanced, distracted, fearful, and politically cowed. It's as if the
world's powers are saying: 'Get out of line, and we will rejuvenate
your wars!' 'Do as we say, or we'll burn down your cities!'.
In other words, Lebanon is, in a very real sense, being held hostage to
its unconfronted, un-policed past and its unchallenged political present.
That is not to say, however, that there is "no exit," no hope, and no
possibilities for change. There are indeed alternatives, but given national,
regional, and international opposition to any attempts to end-run U.S.
foreign policy objectives by applying IHL and U.N. resolutions, counternarratives and attempts at resisting the current hope-destroying political
status quo based on impunity will be met with stiff resistance.
Some concluding thoughts, or "What's law got to do with it?"
How and why has the Middle East come to be synonymous with
29 WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS

187 (Richard J.Finneran ed., Scribner Paperback Poetry 1996) (1921).
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political crises, bloodletting, and violent hatreds? How have the statemaking (not just nationalist discursive) practices and processes over the last
century shaped the use and experience of violence - and thus the
trajectories of its resolution-in formal and informal political domains in a
region that went from Empire to mandates to colonies to refugeedom to UN
membership in less than a half century?
The history and challenges of state formation as a political process in
this region requires closer analysis if we wish to examine the uses of
reconciliation and the application of laws to halt protracted conflicts.
Identities, acts, and memories unfold within state-administered
frameworks. The state (or lack of a state) in some settings in the Middle
East, and the state's assumed monopoly on the use of coercive force, no
less than the way various state agencies, actors, and institutions are key to
shaping and channeling agency and memory, are all crucial components in
conflict resolution. Structures of governance and resource distribution, and
the authority to perform state functions (including the right to discipline
and punish), are what are being fought over (often with violence), as much
as definitions of origins, memories, and cultural identities. To discuss the
prospects for reconciliation in the Middle East, we really need to know
more about the state to appreciate the varieties of agency invoked to
address and redress ongoing violence and victimization.
The lack of a state structure for Palestinians and the weakness of the
state in post-war Lebanon render accountability and agency, and thus
reconciliation, problematic: How should people react to violence and
Citizens or
violations: as Palestinians or as Muslims/Christians?
their
institutional
and
these
questions
have
members?
All
patrilineage
procedural correlatives: Should people choose tribal reconciliation or
courtroom justice? Personal vengeance or public compensation? Private
repression of memory, or public, official amnesia of the past? Sadly, for
the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, lacking any viable overarching
administrative-legal-judicial structure (given the deficiencies and
weaknesses of the PA) nothing can be satisfactorily resolved, and they
remain in a liminal state of having no state in a state-system world, unable
to achieve a sense of personal or collective closure for violations and losses
suffered through violence.
Palestinians under occupation face some special problems not
encountered elsewhere, but the weakness of the state, particularly its
judicial branch, in providing mechanisms through which individuals or
groups can attain justice is common to Lebanon and Iraq as well. The
Middle East is a region particularly unserved and unaffected by either the
rule of law within state borders, or the actions of international humanitarian
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law from outside the region. The fault for this lies neither solely within the
region among nasty and brutish dictators nor solely outside the region in
the manipulations of "the West." It is a shared problem and will require a
shared approach if the concerned parties - the entire world, given this
region's strategic importance - hope to find a resolution.
In discussing reconciliation, we should think in terms of the
positionality of justice: who gets to practice it, who has to suffer its
absence, and where it is actually located, literally and metaphorically.
Justice clearly is not located at present in either Lebanon or in
Israel/Palestine. The fact that structures of justice are sought in Europe, as
in the Sabra and Shatila massacre survivors' case in Belgium (a country
that, as a colonial power, had a lot of blood on its hands) to provide redress
and closure speaks volumes about a common failure of states in the region
to address ongoing problems of impunity.
In reviewing the prospects of TRCs in Israel-Palestine and Lebanon, a
key theme emerges: that ofjudicial and institutionaldeficiencies, not just
cultural dimensions or historical patterns of conflict. In addition to being
searingly memorable, politically deployable, cynically forgotten,
historically misrepresented, and impediments to reconciliation, atrocities
like the Sabra and Shatila massacre, an event which witnessed the
intersection of the Lebanese war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, are
also grave breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights
law. Pursuing a legal route in response to such acts of violence is an
example of agency and subject formation as well as political resistance.
Public attempts at reconciliation, particularly the sorts of Disney-fled
"tribal" performances staged in the mid-1990s in villages in the Chouf
region of Lebanon between Maronites and Druzes by the Ministry for the
Affairs of the Displaced, erase individual subjectivity and agency, silence
subversive voices, and replace true political community and the everrenewing public sphere with a rigid, stereotyped version of tribal belonging
that is at odds with the urban, atomized, fragmented lives most of the
displaced have known for nearly two decades.
Absent any current or future judicial and legal mechanisms to resolve
rather than simply manage conflicts, TRCs by themselves are likely to
reconcile Lebanese, Israelis and Palestinians not to each other, but rather,
to structural inequalities, essentialized identities, and more of what they
have known for too long: violent conflicts. Law - its deployment,
application and affirmation - has everything to do with resolving the
pressing problems of the contemporary Middle East and clearing some
much needed new spaces for individuals and collectivities to breath new air
and live new lives.

